

# Sudan Situation Report Analysis

## Conflict Parties in the Current Crisis

September 2023


International attempts to broker a ceasefire to end the Sudan conflict will continue to see only temporary success at best, with both sides likely to keep fighting for the next six months, while further collaboration between tribal entities and the two main conflict parties could see cross-border tribal conflicts ignite. This document provides background information on the conflict parties involved in the Sudan fighting and violence attributed to them.

### Summary


- The main fighting in Sudan continues to be in Khartoum state, which saw over 70% of all reported conflict violence reported by ACLED between 1 August and 8 September 2023. The Darfur region and North and South Kordofan states have also seen extensive clashes.
- As of 14 September, the RSF was reported to have occupied most of Khartoum city, Sudan's capital.
- The Sudanese Foreign Ministry announced in early September that it would build a permanent headquarters in Port Sudan where many humanitarian organisations and some diplomatic missions have already relocated due to the relative security compared with Khartoum.
- Tribal and ethno-religious loyalties are continuing to fuel recruitment and support for both sides. This is only likely to increase if – as seems likely – the conflict persists. This in turn risks sparking a more general tribal/ethnic conflict, particularly in the Darfur region. It is also alleged that the RSF has been recruiting child soldiers.
- The conflict between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which started on 15 April, could see cross-border tribal conflict reignite, especially because the two main advocates who had previously moderated tribal clashes are now fighting each other.
- The conflict has created severe protection concerns, especially in Darfur where it is alleged that at least **1,100 civilians were massacred** by the RSF in El-Geneina, West Darfur, in June. Recent satellite imagery analysis by **Yale Humanitarian Research Lab** provides evidence of the possible mass disposal of human bodies at a site reported to be a possible mass grave. Internet blackouts and access restrictions make it likely that the full extent of the threats for civilians are seriously underreported.

Figure 1: Reported incidents of conflict violence in Sudan by state, 01 August-08 September 2023 (690 incidents)

Map A shows the states where the highest number of incidents were reported, using varying shades of green. Events in close proximity are shown in a single red dot.



Map B represents the frequency of reported events in the same location in the varying size of the event dots across the whole country.



Note: Due to multiple incidents being recorded in the same location (and symbols therefore overlapping), the number of symbols that can be seen in Map A (on the left) does not always correspond with the overall number of incidents in each state or territory as represented by the colour shading. Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), [www.acleddata.com](http://www.acleddata.com), accessed 16-09/2023

## Overview: conflict parties

The fighting between the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) that erupted on 15 April 2023 has largely been concentrated in Khartoum state. However, there has also been fighting for control of several other urban areas along major roads, especially along the east-west corridor from Kassala, on the border with Eritrea, to West Darfur, with a particular focus on North Kordofan state and the Darfur region. Following the October 2021 military coup that ousted President Omar al-Bashir, it was agreed that the RSF would be integrated into the SAF. However, there were significant tensions between the coup leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the RSF leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as “Hemedti”), over the integration process. The SAF wanted this process to take two years, while the RSF’s leaders insisted on a ten-year timetable, fearing a loss of power and influence.


Despite over five months of clashes, international pressure for talks and at least 17 associated short-lived ceasefires, Khartoum is still contested, with artillery duels and air strikes continuing unabated. Fighting also persists elsewhere, particularly in Darfur, where on 14 June West Darfur governor Khamis Abakar was abducted and later killed by fighters in RSF uniforms. Abakar had previously accused the RSF of “genocide”. Indeed, the UN raised the alarm on 24 June over the ethnic targeting and killing of members of the Masalit community in El Geneina, West Darfur. The **reported** systematic killings of civilians, burning of homes and large-scale destruction of Sirba, West Darfur, at the end of July 2023, suggests such alarm raising is warranted.

Despite such allegations against it, the RSF appears to continue to gain influence in Darfur. On 6 September, 700 Abu Tira soldiers - also known as the Central Reserve Police - alongside 45 military vehicles were reported to have defected to the RSF in El Geneina, West Darfur. Given that the Central Reserve Police were **established** to quell tribal conflicts and have a history of doing this in Darfur, such development is symbolic of the wider territorial gains achieved by the RSF since mid-April. Equally, however, it should be recognised that the tactics of the RSF have not come without resistance. It was reported on 13 September that they had withdrawn from Um Rawaba, North Kordofan, after controlling it for over a month following protests by the town’s residents at the alleged killing of a civilian by the RSF. The RSF is also **reported** to have been pushed out of El Obeid, North Kordofan, at the end of August. The city had previously lived **under siege conditions**.

In recent weeks the SAF have engaged in especially intense clashes with the RSF in Nyala, South Darfur and in Zalingei, Central Darfur. Meanwhile, in South Kordofan, fighting persists between the SAF and the Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction of the SPLM-N with such conflict having concentrated around the state’s capital, Kadugli.

The severe humanitarian needs created by the conflict violence have been exacerbated by flash floods to the southeast of El Obeid which were reported to have **destroyed** approximately 300 homes in early September.

**Figure 2: Reported conflict violence attributed to the RSF and SAF in Sudan, 01 August-08 September 2023**



- **Rapid Support Forces (Janjaweed)**

The RSF originated from the Janjaweed militias, which the government of former president Omar al-Bashir used to suppress a rebellion in the Darfur region that started in 2003. Over time, the militia evolved and was officially established as the RSF in 2013. General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as “Hemedti” or “Little Mohamed”, commands the RSF. He was previously the deputy head of Sudan’s ruling Sovereign Council before being removed from the post in May. Hemedti’s rise to power coincided with the growth and influence of the RSF, which benefited his family’s business interests in various sectors. The RSF was officially incorporated into the state’s coercive apparatus under Hemedti’s command in 2015. In 2017 it gained the status of a “regular force” and was legitimised as an independent security force by law the same year. However, in April 2023, a constitutional decree issued by the chair of the Sovereignty Council and commander in chief of the SAF, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, dissolved the RSF’s legitimate status under Sudanese law and declared it a “rebel force” following the outbreak of fighting.

Hemedti, who recruited members of the RSF from Arab tribes in Darfur, has made the militia culturally, ethnically and religiously more cohesive than the conscripted forces of the SAF. Initially its role mainly focused on operations that the SAF did not want to undertake, carrying out tasks such as clandestine and often dubious actions and hand-to-hand combat. The RSF has its own revenue streams through private companies owned by Hemedti and his family, including investments in gold mining, livestock, and infrastructure. The unit has also retained the Janjaweed’s tactical setup as a mobile guerrilla and counterinsurgency force engaging in domestic conflicts in the Kordofan region, Blue Nile state, and Khartoum state, as well as participating in fighting against Houthi rebels in Yemen. The RSF primarily uses vehicles such as Toyota Land Cruisers equipped with 50-calibre machine guns, at times using confiscated weaponry and vehicles from other militias.

- **Sudanese Armed Forces**

The SAF is the military organisation responsible for the defence of Sudan and is composed of the army, air force and navy. Its origins can be traced back to the Sudan Defence Force, established during the colonial era under British rule. After Sudan’s independence in 1956 the SDF was reorganised into the SAF and has played a significant role in internal and regional conflicts, including the Sudanese civil wars (1955-1972 and 1983-2005) and the conflict in Darfur (2003-2020). The SAF has traditionally been the dominant military force in Sudan and has played a central role in Sudanese politics, with military leaders often assuming key positions of power in the government, such as former president Omar al-Bashir and the current de facto ruler and chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council of Sudan, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who is also the head of the SAF.

- **Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N)**

The SPLM-N is a political and military organisation that was formed in 2011 when a faction of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), which was originally a political party founded in 1983 and currently the ruling party in South Sudan, decided to continue the armed struggle against the government of Sudan primarily in the Sudanese states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The group in Sudan therefore has strong links to the ruling SPLM movement in South Sudan. The SPLM-N advocates for political, economic, and social reforms in Sudan, with a focus on issues affecting marginalised regions especially in South Kordofan, where the majority of the current clashes in which they have been involved have occurred (see Figure 6). The anti-government movement was fuelled by dissatisfaction with where the border between Sudan and South Sudan was agreed, which basically followed the

lines of the established states (e.g. South Kordofan), but with a cut-out for the (still) disputed area of Abyei, where some communities had hoped to be integrated into South Sudan. The movement's primary demands include the right to self-determination, equality, and the end of discrimination against non-Arab and non-Muslim populations. This has often led to armed conflict with the SAF, resulting in significant humanitarian crises, including the displacement of populations and limited access to essential services. For instance, conflict in South Kordofan in 2011 led to the displacement of nearly 400,000 residents of the Nuba mountains and surrounding areas.

Over the years, the SPLM-N has undergone internal divisions and factionalism, including one notable split that occurred in 2017, when a faction led by **Malik Agar** (whom al-Burhan recently appointed deputy chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council in Hemedti's place) broke away from the main faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu. This division has complicated the political landscape and peace negotiations with the Sudanese government, and also the current conflict. Different **factions of the SPLM-N** also supported the Hausa and Berta groups in confrontations in Blue Nile state that occurred in 2022.

- **Joint Struggle Armed Movement Forces (JSAMF)**

Formed after the Juba Agreement (2020), the JSAMF is a joint force composed of a variety of former Darfurian rebel groups, the primary one among these being the Sudan Liberation Army led by Minni Minawi, the governor of Darfur's five states. In May, **Minawi** called for residents to use weapons to "defend themselves from attacks." The JEM and the Gathering of the Sudan Liberation Forces, another Darfur based rebel group, also form part of the JSAMF which finds its greatest influence in El Fasher and rural areas of North Darfur. It is reported to have held a **neutral position** since fighting broke out in mid-April and escorted commercial convoys between Port Sudan and western parts of Darfur and Kordofan. However, this is not to say that it has not been engaged in the conflict. Members of the JSAMF were reported by ACLED to have clashed with the RSF in El Fasher on 3 September, for example, with artillery shelling recorded after the RSF entered El Fasher's market.

- **Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)**

Established in 2003 from a group of educated and politically experienced people from Darfur, the group sought to **delegitimize** Sudan's government through exposing atrocities committed in Darfur and catalyse national reform. Historically, it has aimed to recruit Darfurian Arabs including from the Janjaweed. In 2008 it attacked Omdurman in Khartoum state having refused to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement two years previously. The JEM has not actively fought against the SAF or RSF since mid-April. However, many of its members are reported to be **servicing** in a Joint Force led by Minni Minawi. Moreover, the conflict between the SAF and RSF has **led to divisions** within the JEM leading to two factions, one led by Jibril Ibrahim who has acted as Sudan's finance minister since 2021 and another led by Suleiman Sandal, JEM's political secretary.

- **Sudan Liberation Army - Abdel Wahid Al Nur (SLA-AW)**


The SLA-AW is a Darfurian rebel group with its main centre of influence in **Jebel Marra**, a mountainous area of Central Darfur. Compared with other rebel groups, they have been less significant in national politics and unlike the JEM and SLM-Minawi which signed the Juba Agreement and gained government roles, the SLA-AW opposed it.

## Ethnic and tribal violence

Tribal **clashes** between the Hausa and Nuba tribes in the city of Kosti, White Nile state, occurred separately from the fighting between the SAF and RSF and resulted in the reported deaths of at least 25 people (see Figure 3).

The cross-border dynamics and communal affiliations of tribes and ethnic groups involved in the Sudanese conflict could affect the stability and security of neighbouring Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). These countries are already receiving refugees and returnees, necessitating measures to contain possible spillovers and engage with transborder community leaders. Moreover, Chad, the CAR and Sudan have in common a group of communities whose movement has not previously been stopped by administrative boundaries, including the Rounga, Zaghawa, Massalit and various Arab tribes. Indeed, in August 2022 a cross-border incursion from Chad saw 18 “nomads” killed by “assailants” from Chad, with livestock taken. Retaliatory tribal warfare was halted by the then-deputy head of the Transitional Sovereign Council, Hemedti, who was in Chad at the time for a meeting, and flew to Darfur to defuse tribal tensions. With Hemedti now leading the RSF against the SAF, this could therefore see cross-border tribal conflict reignite, especially with the two main advocates who had previously moderated tribal clashes now fighting each other. Indeed, on 3 July seven tribal leaders in South Darfur pledged their allegiance to the RSF. The leaders from the Beni Halba, Tarjam, Habaniya, Fallata, Misseriya, Taaisha and Rizeigat tribes published their support in a video statement saying they saw the war as a battle between “right and wrong”. These are mainly cattle-herding tribes of Arab origin, which echoes the current profile of the RSF (see explanation above).

**Figure 3: Three reported incidents involving the Hausa and Nuba tribes in Kosti, White Nile state, May 2023**




## Conflict parties: areas of operations

- **Khartoum**

The conflict has been most intense in Khartoum state, centring on Khartoum city. The violence spread from the south of the city into the state’s three urban areas: Khartoum city, Khartoum North (Bahri) and Omdurman. Conflict violence has been persistent since mid-April despite ceasefires. In the past months, the RSF has made several strategic gains. At the end of June, it captured the headquarters of the Central Reserve Police and claimed to have taken considerable numbers of tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Fighting has centred around key strategic transport routes, notably the Shambat bridge which is the RSF’s single means of moving troops and equipment across the Nile river from Omdurman to Khartoum city via Bahri (Khartoum North).

**Figure 4: Reported location of air strikes and clashes in Khartoum state, 01 August-08 September 2023**

Between 01 August and 08 September 2023, 364 armed clashes were reported in Khartoum state by ACLED. All such incidents involved the RSF and/or SAF. Additionally, at least 55 air strikes were reported in Khartoum state during the same period, all of which were attributed to the SAF except for one incident in which the conflict party went unidentified. Fighting has been especially intense in the neighbourhoods surrounding the Shambat Bridge and the SAF's Armored Corps base in Khartoum.




Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED); www.acleddata.com. Access date: 16/09/2023. Base Map Source: OpenMapTiles.org.

Notes: The coordinates of the reported incidents are not precise. Weapons delivered by aircraft, drones and helicopters are included in the ACLED category of "air strikes", as well as air-to-ground attacks that do not involve any exchange of fire with forces on the ground. Base map source: OpenMapTiles.org.

- **Darfur**

**Figure 5: Examples of the reported locations of conflict parties' operations in Darfur, 01 August - 08 September 2023**



Source: Insecurity Insight Monitoring. Base Map Source: OpenMapTiles.org.

The Darfur region (comprising the five Darfur states) has also seen wide-ranging political and conflict violence. Several local militias have been involved on both sides of the SAF-RSF conflict. Rival tribes have also attacked the RSF and SAF, and conflict over land between herders and pastoralists has continued in the region. The area was previously highly militarised, and is strategically significant for both sides in the current conflict due to the number of military bases in the region. Large scale destruction and burning of villages has been reported in multiple locations across Darfur. As of 04 August 2023, it was **reported** that seven villages or towns had been “nearly destroyed or burned completely” in West Darfur alone since mid-April. There are also **allegations** that civilians have been systematically massacred in Darfur by the RSF. Analysis of **satellite imagery** by the Sudan Conflict Observatory Monitoring appears to support reports of mass body disposal in El-Geneina, West Darfur. While looting continued, the situation was reported to be **relatively calm** in the city as of 14 September.


## North Kordofan

In North Kordofan state violence has mainly centred on the town of El Obeid, which the RSF has sought to capture due to its strategic value as a central transition point that links routes to both Darfur and Khartoum. The town was reported to have been under siege by the RSF but the SAF were said to have repelled them at the end of August. El Obeid also has an airport and is the central commercial district for the western states of Sudan. Fighting has also occurred in areas near to the South Sudanese border – but this has seen limited conflict, with the main effort of both sides concentrated in urban areas, around military bases, in strategic areas such as El Obeid and at airports to ensure the movement of logistical supplies.

## South Kordofan

Since mid-April, violence in South Kordofan state has centred on clashes between the SPLM-N (Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction) and the SAF. Such violence has been especially intense in Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan, but is also reported to have occurred in Dilling and several other locations, including in Kologi to the east of Kadugli. Following several weeks of violent clashes, it was reported that the SPLM-N had **“gained control”** over multiple

**Figure 6: Four reported incidents of clashes between the Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction of the SPLM-N and SAF in South Kordofan, June 2023**



SAF garrisons in South Kordofan on 9 July, while also closing the road between Karkal and Kadugli, for reasons that are unclear. This occurred two days after reports that South Sudan's president, **Salva Kiir**, had persuaded the commander of the SPLM-N (Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction) not to attack the SAF in the Nuba mountains in South Kordofan or Blue Nile states. In addition to violence between the SPLM-N and RSF, violent clashes were also reported in June between the SAF and RSF in Kadugli, as well as close to Jabal Abyad mountain in the Rashad district of South Kordofan. It is reported that the **SAF withdrew** from Mardis, South Kordofan, on 4 August without engaging with the SPLM-N. Nonetheless, clashes have persisted in South Kordofan into September, further displacing civilians as illustrated above in Figure 6.

## Conflict objectives and strategies

- Understanding the objective of specific parties in a conflict can be important for aid agencies in order to maintain their neutrality. Below are key known objectives of the various Sudanese conflict parties and the way in which they hope to achieve them.
- The leadership of both the RSF and SAF appear to want to take/secure control of the apparatus of national governance and/or force their opponents to cede some – or ideally all – control over these levers of power. This is particularly relevant in Khartoum city and state, which they believe they must control in order to be able to control the rest of the country. This also applies to the apparatus of governance at the more local/state levels.
- In doing this, they want to present themselves as the protectors of their own ethnic and political supporters, and their opponents as an existential threat to them. As an example, the SAF, backed by Abdelaziz al-Hilu's SPLM-N faction, has sought to force the RSF out of Kadugli in South Kordofan.
- The SPLM-N has acted as a blocking force attempting to prevent any RSF reinforcements from reaching areas of conflict (and possibly also escaping from these areas), claiming that they are seeking to protect local civilians from “armed militias”. However, they also appear to be acting independently of both main conflict parties, with heavy clashes occurring on 21-22 June in which the group attacked the SAF in the South Kordofan city of El Dalanj. South Kordofan contains the majority of Sudan's oil fields, but is also an essential logistics route to West Darfur and South Sudan. Therefore, the SPLM-N seeks to portray itself as a third major force in the ongoing conflict.
- In Khartoum's tri-city area (comprising Khartoum city, Khartoum North (Bahri) and Omdurman), the SAF has relied on air strikes to both defend its own areas of control and undermine RSF defences. Indeed, almost all reported air strikes have been observed in Khartoum state (see Figure 4, above). Conversely, the RSF has mounted an effective ground campaign backed by artillery, rocket and mortar fire – for example making the airport unusable in the initial days of the current conflict.
- Both sides have generally relied on small arms (rifles and machine guns) and, to a lesser extent, crew-served weapons such as mortars and smaller artillery pieces.
- The ready availability of explosive weapons such as grenades and rocket-propelled grenades suggest that they too have been widely used, although evidence for this is more anecdotal than for small arms, artillery and air strikes. The SAF appears to have some international weapons supplied by the United Arab Emirates, while the United States has accused the Russian mercenary Wagner Group of supplying the RSF with missiles.
- Fighters from both sides have been accused of looting and sexual violence, although it is currently far from clear that this is actually a tactic directed/ordered by senior commanders or merely a side effect of the lack of discipline and effective command-and-control mechanisms.



## Important ethnic and tribal groups in Sudan

Sudan is home to numerous ethnic groups and tribes, each with its own distinct cultural and linguistic characteristics.

The Arab population is estimated to form 70% of the country's total population. They are almost entirely Muslims and speak predominantly Sudanese Arabic. Arab tribes began to arrive in Sudan in the 12th century. However, the vast majority of Arabs in Sudan are Arabised indigenous people rather than direct descendants of Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula.

### Pastoralists/herders and farmers

Originally, the Janjaweed consisted of Arabic-speaking nomadic and semi-settled pastoralists known as the **Baggara**, who herded cattle and camels in the Sahel grasslands south of the Sahara. They migrated to the region in the 18th century, spanning Chad, Libya, and Sudan, and intermingled with non-Arab communities living there. Despite the increasing agricultural settlement in Darfur during the early 20th century, the Arabic-speaking nomads and non-Arab **Fur**-speaking farmers largely co-operated successfully.

However, the situation changed in the 1970s with the onset of a new drought cycle in the Sahel, causing disruptions across northern Africa, which led to tensions and often clashes between the two communities. During the 1980s civil war in Chad, Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi played a role in organising Sudanese Arabs to fight against the government forces of Chad. Following their defeat, an influx of weapons flowed back across the border into Sudan, exacerbating conflicts between Arab pastoralists and Fur farmers over control of land and water resources. In 2003, under al-Bashir's rule, the military armed and recruited Arab nomads and pastoralists to fight mostly non-Arab armed groups that were rebelling against the state, and these groups included other pastoralist groups such as the **Beja**, **Zaghawa** and **Nuer**.

- **Baggara:** The Baggara tribe is composed of various Arabic-speaking pastoralist groups, such as the **Misseriya**, **Hawazma** and **Rizeigat**. They primarily reside in western Sudan, particularly in the regions of Darfur and Kordofan, and parts of River Nile state.
- **Beja:** The Beja tribe is primarily found in eastern Sudan, along the Red Sea coast and in the eastern desert regions. They are traditionally nomadic herders and traders, and have their own unique language and cultural traditions.
- **Berta (or Funj):** The Berta ethnic group live along the border of Sudan and Ethiopia. Most Berta are farmers involved in raising livestock, trading, beekeeping and coffee cultivation.
- **Fur:** The Fur tribe is indigenous to Darfur in western Sudan and are known for their agricultural practices. The Fur people have been **significantly affected** by the conflicts in the region.
- **Hausa:** Hausa communities tend to live and work in central Sudan along the country's rivers, and most cities have Hausa communities. Originally from West Africa, they have lived in Sudan for centuries, often settling there along the long land journey to and from Mecca for the Hajj. The Hausa people were long denied Sudanese citizenship and many continue to face discrimination. In June 2022 the Hausa community in Blue Nile state was granted its own emirate in the state, which was opposed by the Berta ethnic group.
- **Masalit:** The non-Arab Masalit ethnic group are found across western Sudan (primarily in Geneina, the capital of West Darfur), eastern Sudan and eastern Chad. The group speaks Masalit as a language, although there are different dialects, and are mainly subsistence farmers.

- **Nuba:** The Nuba people are a diverse group inhabiting the Nuba mountains region in central Sudan, and there are a variety of subgroups within the Nuba people each with its own language and customs. The Nuba are primarily farmers, but also herd cattle and raise domestic animals. The Nuba have faced marginalisation and conflict, particularly during Sudan's civil war. **Nuer:** The Nuer people are semi-nomadic pastoralists who herd cattle for a living. Although they are mainly concentrated in the Greater Upper Nile region of South Sudan and the Gambella region of Ethiopia, instances have been recorded of clashes along the Sudan-South Sudan border areas between the Nuer and South Sudanese Sholuk tribes. Such clashes occurred in **August 2021**, and led to a number of IDPs being displaced in South Kordofan and White Nile states.
- **Rizeigat** (also, Rezeigat, Rizigat or Rizayqat) are a tribe of the Bedouin Baggara. The Abbala Rizeigat live in North Darfur and eastern Chad, and herd camels. The Baggara Rizeigat live in South Darfur and herd cattle. During the Darfur conflict that started in 2003 the Abbala Rizeigat were instrumental to the Sudanese government's counterinsurgency campaign and gained notoriety as part of the Janjaweed militia. RSF leader Hemedti comes from the Abbala Mahriya clan and Musa Hilal from the Abbala Mahamid clan.
- **Runga:** The Runga live in the north and north-west of Chad and in the Central African Republic. Some are Arabic-speaking, while others are Aiki-speaking.
- **Taisha:** The Taisha are a cattle-herding Baggara tribe from south-west Darfur who live in South Kordofan, the Darfur region and Chad.
- **Zaghawa:** The Zaghawa tribe resides primarily in western Sudan near the border with Chad. They are known for their cattle herding and agriculture. The Zaghawa people have also been **affected** by the conflicts in Darfur.

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