

“The UN Shouldn’t Even Exist Anymore”: Social Media Comments Post Myanmar Earthquake

Tracking Aid Narratives on Social Media

This briefing by Insecurity Insight analyses social media activity from 01 September to 05 October 2025, assessing observed narratives in Myanmar related to the humanitarian response to the March 28 earthquake.

October 2025



PAST EDITIONS: [“Myanmar’s People Are Bombed”](#) (02 June-26 August), [Is This Another Propaganda Campaign](#) (28 March-05 July), [We Haven’t Received A Single Bottle Of Water](#) (27 March-16 June), [Let The World Know](#) (27 March-30 April)

Insights From Social Media To Safeguard Aid Delivery

This brief analyses social media engagement in Myanmar between 01 September and 05 October 2025, focusing on how social media users discuss humanitarian aid post-earthquake. During this period, public attention shifted from the 28 March 2025 earthquake towards ongoing displacement, new tremors in September, and debate around child protection following a UNICEF statement on an airstrike on a Rakhine boarding school. The analysis began with over 1,300 posts referencing the aid sector and earthquake-related terms. From this sample, the 35 high-engagement posts which generated **1,871 user comments**, were downloaded and manually categorised by sentiment and theme.

This dataset provides an analysis of public perceptions of aid and protection in Myanmar at a time when humanitarian action remains entangled with conflict narratives. The findings highlight how communities use social media both to express gratitude for assistance and to contest it when it intersects with conflict dynamics. Overall, online discussions about aid remain polarised but instructive: while posts linked to recovery and delivery are viewed positively, those relating to protection and rights face more hostility. This reflects a wider erosion of trust in institutions, and an environment where aid, protection, and accountability are increasingly reframed through political and moral argument rather than humanitarian principle.

Main Findings

- Twenty posts on aid delivery in the aftermath of the 28 March 2025 earthquake reached an estimated 490K users and generated 208 comments. Posts highlighted WASH recovery, school reconstruction, livelihood and cash support. The tone was positive and forward-looking, centred on resilience, partnership, and continuity of assistance. 68% of comments were positive towards the aid sector, while a small number included direct requests for help, showing users’ awareness of geographic or sectoral gaps in aid delivery.
- Two edited media posts on the 23 and 28 September earthquakes near Pyin Oo Lwin and Yedashe drew 303 comments, none of which mentioned aid directly. Instead, users focused on media credibility, accusing outlets of reusing old photos from the March earthquake and employing clickbait tactics. A small number used the tremors metaphorically to criticise corruption and state failure. These discussions were largely non-violent and political in tone, with frustration directed at information reliability rather than aid actors.

- Eight posts on refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) generated 371 comments. Coverage centred on restricted humanitarian access, worsening displacement, and chronic underfunding. The comment space was highly polarised: 16% of comments were negative towards aid actors, 15% criticised armed groups or the junta, and nearly half debated resettlement and return. Strong anti-Rohingya and anti-Muslim rhetoric was widespread, including open hate speech and dehumanising language. A smaller number of comments questioned the neutrality of UN agencies or framed them as complicit with the junta.
- Three media posts covering UNICEF’s statement (12–13 September) condemning the airstrike on a boarding school in Kyauktaw Township, Rakhine State, which killed at least 19 students, generated 521 comments, of which 59% were negative towards UNICEF or the wider aid sector. Commenters dismissed the statement as repetitive or performative, criticised UNICEF’s neutrality, or denied that those killed were students, calling the site a military “training school.” This denial narrative reframed the attack as legitimate and illustrates the erosion of civilian distinction in online discourse.
- Across the dataset of 1,871 comments, 490 (26%) were negative towards the aid sector—the highest proportion recorded since monitoring began in May 2025. Previous cycles ranged from 3% to 7% negative engagement, with a brief decline below 1% in September, suggesting a renewed concentration of anti-aid discourse in October. The shift appears linked to the greater circulation of UN and organisation-authored posts through embassy and media accounts, as well as a broader query scope that captured more content related to protection and contested incidents.

Negative comments clustered around familiar themes: claims of complicity or bias, accusations of diversion or resale, and identity-based gatekeeping of who “deserves” aid. In parallel, many comments still contained specific requests for food, medicine, or shelter, indicating that criticism and humanitarian need coexist. Overall, the findings point to an increasingly polarised environment, where trust in aid depends less on values-based messaging and more on posts which visibly show aid delivery.

Key Takeaways

Posts About Aid Delivery In The Aftermath of The 28 March 2025 Earthquake

Twenty posts about aid delivery in the aftermath of the 28 March 2025 earthquake (from three INGOs, one UN agency, one LNGO, two embassies (UK, Germany), and one edited media outlet) reached around 490K social media users, focusing largely on water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) recovery, school reconstruction, livelihood and cash support, and health service restoration. The tone across posts was positive and forward-looking, highlighting resilience, partnership, and continuity of assistance. Updates by one INGO dominated with stories of restored water systems, food and cash aid, and farming support; UNICEF stressed ongoing child and community recovery; and an LNGO showcased school rebuilding; while the UK and German governments framed their contributions around large-scale reach and reconstruction support.

- A total of **208 comments** were analysed across the 20 post earthquake-aid delivery posts. **68% of the comments were positive towards the aid sector.** The remaining comments included 58 neutral remarks (28%), nine comments which included calls for help (4%), seven negative comments about aid actors (3%), and three negative comments about the military junta (1%).

“Thank you so much XXX and XXX Myanmar Team on behalf of all the people in need



“I always respect the XXX team. I am happy and proud.” (XXX အဖွဲ့ကြီးကိုအမြဲလေးစားလျှက်ပါ။ ဝမ်းသာတယ်။ ဂုဏ်ယူပါတယ်။)”

- **Requests for help:** A small group of nine comments included direct requests for assistance. These reflect community awareness of gaps in aid delivery and act as spontaneous self-targeting, where affected individuals highlight unmet needs in the comment sections of widely viewed posts.

“Can we get it on the Ayeyarwady side too, please?”

(ရောဝတီဘက်မှာရောတူးလို့ရပါလားရှင်)

- **Neutral Comments:** These comments show a non-confrontational, social use of aid-related content, where community members engage in casual exchanges without tension or use the space to ask questions.

“Could you clarify, please?” (ပြောပြပါလား)

- **Negative comments towards the aid sector:** Seven comments were critical of aid actors, describing organisations as “for show” or noting that “no one came.” Such isolated criticisms in response to posts mainly published by organisations themselves on the earthquake aid suggests present but limited frustration rather than outright hostility.

“A show-off organization.” (ဟန်ပြ အဖွဲ့ကြီး)

What This Tells Us

1. **Trust in aid actors:** Social media engagement around earthquake aid between September and October 2025 indicates positive perceptions of organisations who provided aid.² Unlike other narratives which are more closely related to conflict dynamics, there is no significant evidence of politicisation or disinformation targeting aid groups in this dataset.
2. **Some comments reflect ongoing unmet needs:** Calls for help embedded within positive threads highlight continued humanitarian gaps in water access and education support. Monitoring these comments can serve as a low-cost community feedback mechanism to identify underserved areas.

Public reactions to new earthquake reports on 23 and 28 September 2025

Two edited media posts—one on the 4.9-magnitude earthquake near Pyin Oo Lwin (23 September) and another on the 4.1-magnitude quake near Yedashe, Bago Region (28 September) were collected by the “earthquake + aid” keyword filter and together generated 303 comments. Both were included in the dataset because they referenced the earlier 28 March earthquake through shared terminology, even though they reported on separate, smaller tremors. None of the 303 comments mentioned the aid sector directly. Instead, users mainly focused on media credibility, criticising the outlets for reusing old March-earthquake photos and accusing them of clickbait, and exploiting disaster imagery. Some commenters used the tremors metaphorically to condemn corruption and oppression. These discussions were largely non-violent, and directed at state failings rather than aid actors.

¹ Written in English

² The sample of aid organisations which posted about their earthquake response in the analysed period remains small and it is possible that additional aid actors posted about the earthquake response but were not captured in the dataset because their account IP locations were registered outside Myanmar

Perceptions of Displacement and Return

Eight posts related to refugees and IDPs (seven from edited media outlets and one from a UN agency) generated **371 comments** and focused on the Rakhine and Magway Regions. Coverage highlighted rising displacement, restricted humanitarian access, and the growing impact of underfunding. Across all 371 comments **16% were negative towards the aid sector**, 15 percent criticised armed groups or the military junta, and 49% centred on resettlement issues, many using harsh language (including instances of hate speech) to condemn one side or the other. Media reports detailed severe food insecurity, maternal hardship, and attacks on civilian shelters, while the UN statement emphasised the urgent need to protect civilians, schools, and displaced families. Edited media posts also covered UNHCR's discussions with the military council on refugee repatriation.

Main Narratives

- **Critical views of the aid sector:** Several comments question the role and effectiveness of UN agencies and the aid sector, describing them as slow, overly focused on statements, or too close to the junta. This shows limited confidence in international organisations' neutrality or impact in relation to supporting displaced communities.

"The UN worries when it's Muslims." (UN ချရာ မူဝလိမ်အတွက်တော့ ပူတတ်တယ်။)

"The UN's actions seem to be more about showcasing the refugee crisis to the international community in order to attract more donations, rather than actually addressing the issues effectively. 😊 If they truly solved the problems efficiently, all those so-called human rights organisations would lose their income, wouldn't they? 😊 Looks like this whole thing has turned into a big dollar-making business. 🤑" (UN လုပ်နေတဲ့လုပ်ရပ်က နိုင်ငံတကာတွေဆီကဒုက္ခသည်အကြောင်းပြပြီး ထပ်မံအလှူခံမျက်ရည်ချူကြမလို့လက်တွေ့ထိရောက်အောင်မလုပ်ဆောင်တာအသိသာကြီးဘလေ 😊ထိရောက်အောင်ဖြေရှင်းလို့ကရင်လူအခွင့်အရေးအယောင်ဆောင်အဖွဲ့တွေအတွက်ဝင်ငွေတွေပြတ်သွားမှတပေါ့ 😊ဒေါ်လာအိုးကြီးဖြစ်နေတာကိုဒီကိစ္စက 🤑)

- **Strong anti-Rohingya comments and hate speech:** Many comments use derogatory language towards Muslim Rohingya communities and repeatedly suggest that refugees be relocated to Naypyitaw, Yangon, or other regions instead of Rakhine. These remarks illustrate persistent social divisions and resistance to refugee return in current public discussions.

"The Rakhine people will never accept the biased UN officials who side with the Rohingya and the militant groups."

(ဘိုးဘိုးမသမီးသားကလတဖက်ပိတ်မင်းရဲ့ ကုလားတိအကြမ်းဖက်အကောင်တိကိုတကောင်းလဲရခိုင်ပြည်ကလက်မခံဖာမမာပေါက်ရေအဖွဲ့)

"Trash should be put where trash goes—the world's filthiest, most detestable creatures are those "Kula"; send them to Pakistan or Bangladesh, their own kind."

(အမှိုက်ကို အမှိုက်ပစ်ရမယ့်နေရာမှာသာ ထားသင့်တယ်
ကမ္ဘာ့အညစ်ပတ်ဆုံးရဲ့စရာအကောင်းဆုံးတိရစ္ဆာန်တွေကမ္ဘာမှာ အကြမ်းအဖက်ဆုံးကလည်းအဲဒီကလားစုတ်တွေပဲပျံချင်းပျံရင် သူတို့နဲ့ မျိုးတူ ဗီဇတူပါကစွတ်နဲ့ နဲ့ ဘင်္ဂလားဒေ့ရှ် နိုင်ငံတွေမှာ မျှပြီးထားလိုက်တာ အကောင်းဆုံးပဲ)

- **Conflict-related polarisation :** Some comments describe IDP areas as connected to armed groups or suggest that strikes targeted militants rather than civilians, while others denounce military attacks and call for accountability. These contrasting narratives

indicate that views of protection are closely tied to perceptions of conflict and legitimacy.

- “There are no IDP camps—only rebel camps.”(စစ်ရှောင်တဲ့မရှိဘူး သူပုန်စခန်းဘဲရှိတယ်)
- “When rebels shelter in towns and villages, there will be consequences.”(သူဟန်ခိုနားမြို့ရွာများပြာကြမြေခရှိမည်ပ)
- “The suffering isn’t new — for many years impostors, infiltrators and violent militants, aided by Bengalis and the UNHCR, have been plotting together; it goes back to the time of U Khin Nyunt.” (ဒုက္ခသည် အယောင်ဆောင်တွေ ခိုးဝင်ကလားအစွန့်ရောက်အကြမ်းဖက်သမား ဘင်္ဂလီ အားပေး UNHCR အတူပေါင်း ကြံစည်လာတာ နှစ်ပေါင်း မနည်းဘူး ဦးခင်ညွန့်လက်ထက်ကထဲက)

→ Public narratives portraying communities as outsiders or “terrorist sympathisers,” alongside claims that IDP camps are “rebel bases,” weaken the core IHL principle of protection of civilians based on the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants. Such language blurs the line between combatants and civilians, making it easier to justify or excuse harm to protected groups and sites. It also fosters social acceptance of exclusion, forced displacement, and restricted aid, indirectly undermining obligations under IHL to protect all civilians and ensure impartial humanitarian relief. For humanitarian actors, these attitudes heighten access and security risks, narrowing the operational space for neutral, needs-based protection.

What This Tells Us

- **Protection messaging can trigger harmful discourse - conflict sensitivity is very important.** Neutral, needs-based language while necessary for aid agencies is insufficient on emotion driven social media platforms;
- **Hate speech undermines protection.** Xenophobic/anti-muslim rhetoric normalises exclusion and can deter access or invite harm.
- **Audiences look to the international aid sector for reassurance and protection:** audiences want clear safeguards against diversion and evidence that the most vulnerable actually received aid. Failure to communicate reassuringly leaves the aid sector vulnerable to harmful misinterpretation of what has never been articulated.

Reactions to UNICEF’s Call for Child Protection

Three media posts on the 12 and 13 September 2025 reported UNICEF’s statement condemning the airstrike on a boarding school in Kyauktaw Township, Rakhine State, which killed at least 19 students aged 15–21 and injured over 20 others. **Together, the three posts generated 521 comments, 59 percent** of which were negative towards UNICEF and the wider aid sector. The posts quote UNICEF’s statement and its appeal for all parties to protect schools as safe spaces under international law. Although UNICEF’s statement avoided directly naming the responsible conflict party, all three edited media outlets identified the military junta as responsible, framing the event as part of a pattern of escalating attacks on civilians in Rakhine. Coverage linked the incident to a wider breakdown of child protection and educational safety, noting Arakan Army (AA) threats of retaliation and UNICEF’s call for unrestricted humanitarian access.

- **Fatigue and cynicism:** Many commenters ridiculed the UNICEF statement as repetitive, performative or ineffective and requested concrete action instead of words.

“They’re just pretending — full of hypocrisy.” (အဲ့အဖွဲ့ကဟန်ပြပဲ ကျက်သတိုးတွေပါ)

“The UN and its partners only release statements; they never actually do anything. Just living off donations.” UN နဲ့ အပေါင်းပါတီတွေက ကြေငြာချက်ထုတ်ယူကလွဲလို့ ဘာသောက်ဖြစ်မှမရှိကြဘူး အထင်ကိုမကြီးတာ ပေးတာယူကျွေးတာစားအဖို့သက်သက်ပဲ

- **Accusations of complicity or bias:** A number of comments framed any UN engagement with junta officials as legitimising the regime and accused international agencies of being politically compromised.

“UNICEF will only be happy when all Myanmar people are killed by junta bombs.” (စကစဗုံးကျလို့မြန်မာပြည်သူတွေအကုန်လုံးသေမှ unicef ကပျော်နေမှာအနေအထားရောက်မှာ)

- **Delegitimising the victims:** Numerous posts denied that those killed were civilians or students, labelling the site an “AA training school” and using that claim to justify or excuse the strike.

“သွေးနံရင်း၍ ပွင့်သောပန်း Everybody known this is Rebel AA base. These are not students. These are Rebel AA from Myanmar. Why are you blaming about neighbour country? What is yours media's rules? Why yours country doesn't have media rules? Why are you silent when too many over 900 peoples were killed by Myanmar Rebel AA? Are you wife of Rebel AA? If you want to say something, you should be find of the base. This kyaktaw township is war base. They don't like military education so too many school are closed. But Myanmar Rebel AA are grouping and fighting to Myanmar Military. These Rebel AA are raping and killing too many peoples including children. Our Myanmar Government will be report yours countries governments and social if you are blaming our countries case.”³

“It’s a military training school.” (စစ်သင်တန်းကျောင်း)

“Don’t worry-killing terrorists isn’t something to feel bad about.” (မဆိုးရိမ်းပါနဲ့ကွာအကြမ်းဖက်တဲ့ကောင်တွေကိုသတ်တာ ဘာမှစိတ်မပူစရာမလို့)

- The social media reactions to UNICEF’s statement on school attacks reveal a growing vulgarisation of international humanitarian law (IHL) and the norms protecting children and education in conflict. Core principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution are stripped of their legal context and redeployed as political rhetoric. Terms such as “students,” “terrorists,” and “training camps” are selectively invoked to reclassify schools as military objectives and to shift the burden of proof from attacker to victim. Sarcasm and denial narratives collapse the legal distinction between civilians and combatants, undermining the special protection afforded to children, teachers, and educational facilities under IHL. The practical and normative effect is to normalise attacks on education, legitimise violations, and erode compliance with IHL obligations to spare civilians and civilian objects. For humanitarian agencies, monitoring and countering such narratives online is therefore an operational necessity to preserve community acceptance, uphold the protective status of schools, and maintain access for neutral, needs-based aid.

- **Hate speech and incitement:** There are frequent dehumanising, anti-Rohingya and anti-Muslim remarks and calls for harsh measures — rhetoric that directly threatens

³ Most of this comment written in English

protection and normalises violence against the targeted community

“This is worth it. 900 Burmese people were killed in one place by the Rakhine in 2024. Many children were killed by the Rakhine terrorists. This is worth it. We Stand with Myanmar Army” (comment written in English by a local influencer with a public profile)

- **Calls for accountability and protection:** A smaller but visible group demanded accountability, stronger protection for children and schools, and concrete steps (not just statements), showing that some audience segments expect action.

“Children are neither targets nor shields-don’t be wicked.” (comment written in English but user based in Myanmar)

“Bombing a school is ethnic cleansing.” (စာသင်ကျောင်းကို ဗုံးကြဲတာကလူမျိုးတုံးတဖြတ်မှုပဲ)

- **Expressions of grief and condemnation of the junta:** Alongside hostility to international actors, many commenters expressed sorrow, blamed the military for war crimes, and called for international intervention or justice.

“I cannot fathom the mentality of an army that would slaughter innocent teachers and pupils.”

(တော်တော်ကောင်းတဲ့စစ်တပ်ပဲအပြစ်မဲ့ကျောင်းသူ ကျောင်းသားတွေကိုဘယ်လိုစိတ်နဲ့များ သတ်ဖြတ်ရဲလဲမသိဘူး)

What This Tells Us

- **Delegitimisation undermines protection:** The “not students / AA base” narrative is persistent, framing civilian casualties as combatants and directly eroding IHL protections for education, children, and schools. It is part of a wider phenomenon in which the “comment section” – enabling social media users to react to posts – is systematically exploited to cast doubt on the civilian nature of attacked objects. In doing so, it shifts the broader, non-expert understanding of protection obligations under IHL: instead of assuming protection as the expected norm, audiences are encouraged to adopt doubt and suspicion toward the affected communities. Journalists and the wider public are encouraged to investigate the ‘militarisation’ of civilian objects rather than focusing on calls for accountability from conflict parties attacking schools.
- **Generic and standard phrasing has lost credibility on social media:** Repeated “deep concern” phrasing provokes ridicule and reinforces perceptions that the UN and aid agencies are performative rather than protective. Audiences expect deep concern to be expressed through credible wording and visible action and communication on accountability.
- **Hate speech undermines protection:** The prevalence of slurs and celebratory rhetoric around attacks normalises harm and may translate into real-world risks for children, teachers, and aid workers—not just reputational damage online. In the age of widespread social media use, protection work has to include the online space.
- **Credibility relies on transparent, timely communication:** In the age of social media, aid agencies have to balance managing their relationships with real-world powers with reputations among online audiences. Public scepticism about who was killed and

whether sites were civilian highlights that factual clarity matters as much as empathy. Where direct verification is impossible, agencies should explain the limits of available evidence—arising from restricted access to affected areas—and demonstrate a willingness to triangulate local sources in order to maintain trust. At the same time, uncertainty about facts must be communicated carefully, without reinforcing narratives that cast doubt on the civilian status of attacked communities. When silence is taken as doubt about the facts, the protection of vulnerable communities is unintentionally further undermined.

Increase in Negative Sentiment Towards Aid Actors

From **1,871 comments**, **490 (26.2%) were negative** about the aid sector and **150 (8.0%) were positive**. This period shows the strongest concentration of anti-aid commentary observed since post-earthquake monitoring started in March 2025. Although direct comparisons are indicative rather than exact due to varying search parameters, negative sentiment expanded from earlier low levels (4-7%) to notable prominence in October, reflecting renewed visibility and intensity of criticism towards aid actors. Across previous reporting cycles, negative comments towards aid actors accounted for **four %** (July 2025), **7%** (August 2025) and **less than 1%** (September 2025). Two main factors appear to drive this resurgence:

1. **Increased circulation of organisation-authored and UN posts** via embassy and media accounts, which tend to attract higher scrutiny and polarised reactions.
2. **A shift in query focus** during this monitoring round which could have included more aid sector statements, protection issues, and contested incidents and likely amplified exposure to critical and politicised commentary compared to earlier datasets that focused more on delivery updates or community-led initiatives.

What the negative comments cluster around:

1. **“Concern-only” statements:** commenters criticise aid actors for repeated expressions of concern without visible action
2. **Complicity claims:** aid routed through organisations, actors, and routes controlled by the military junta are framed as complicity, while others allege the opposite — bias toward ethnic armed organisations.
3. **Diversion, skimming, and resale:** Accusations that aid is “stolen” or “sold in the black market” remain persistent, repeating distrust patterns observed in the past six months. Repeated calls for “direct delivery,” bypassing intermediaries and formal coordination remain.
4. **Gatekeeping who ‘deserves’ aid:** Some comments weaponise identity, with xenophobic rhetoric excluding groups from receiving assistance. These narratives continue to normalise exclusion and legitimise harm.
5. **Delegitimising incidents and victims:** Commenters have recast schools, IDP camps, or hospitals as “military sites” or “legitimate targets”. These erode humanitarian protection norms under international humanitarian law (IHL).
6. **Underneath the noise: concrete needs:** Amid the criticism of the aid sector, many comments still include genuine appeals for food, medicine, winter items, and shelter—demonstrating that discontent often coexists with need. Even critical users articulate specific delivery gaps, providing actionable feedback.


Other resources

The Shrinking Humanitarian Space on Social Media: This report - in [English](#) and [French](#) - provides an in-depth analysis of how public online narratives are reshaping the operating environment of the aid sector in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The report focuses on the risks and harms posed by harmful public narratives that frame aid as illegitimate, politicised or foreign controlled and fills a critical gap in digital risk analysis.



Armed drones are an escalating threat in humanitarian settings, with their use expected to grow. Adapting to this growing threat means rethinking security risk measures in high-risk contexts. This practical guide by Insecurity Insight brings together current best practice and is available in [French](#), [Burmese](#), and [English](#). Individual resources:


- Outside When a Drone is Spotted: [Arabic](#), [Burmese](#), [English](#), [French](#)
- Inside a Building During a Drone Attack: [Arabic](#), [Burmese](#), [English](#), [French](#)
- Responding to Drone Attacks on Aid Work: [Burmese](#), [English](#), [French](#)
- Traveling in High-Risk Areas: [Burmese](#), [English](#), [French](#)
- Adapted for the protection of health services based in Myanmar in [English](#) and [Burmese](#).



According to the Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition (SHCC), health facilities were taken over and used for non-medical purposes by the AA and MAF at least 13 times in Rakhine state between March and November 2024, a sharp increase from two such incidents in 2023. Hospital occupations were mostly recorded in Kyaukpyu and Thandwe districts, and sometimes facilities were used for military operations. Read the full factsheet in [Burmese](#) and [English](#). Download the [data](#)



Violence against health care providers and facilities is a growing concern in Myanmar. **While complete prevention may not be possible, awareness, preparedness, and strategic planning can help mitigate risks.** Drawing from Insecurity Insight's comprehensive Security Risk Management for Health Care Services Handbook (in [Arabic](#), [English](#), [French](#) and [Spanish](#)), this series of regional reports covering [Mandalay](#), [Kayin](#), [Rakhine](#), [Sagaing](#) and [Shan](#) offers concrete measures for health care providers, working to support local health workers in challenging work environments.



Data Use and Privacy Disclaimer

This report includes analysis of publicly available social media content collected from open platforms. All data has been anonymised to remove or obscure identifying details, and no content from closed groups was used. The analysis was conducted in the public interest and in line with the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), under a legitimate interest basis. The purpose of this analysis is to support humanitarian dialogue, inform policy, protect aid workers and those they help, and contribute to public interest research. This document is published by Insecurity Insight - a Humanitarian to Humanitarian (H2H) organisation committed to the Humanitarian Principles. It is supported by the H2H Fund which is supported by aid from the UK government. The opinions expressed in it do not reflect in any way the position of the H2H Network or the UK government who are not responsible for the content expressed in this document.

We welcome questions and feedback. Share what you're observing both on the ground and online. Your insights help us keep the analysis accurate and up-to-date. Email: info@insecurityinsight.org.

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