

“The devil’s envoy”

Tracking Aid Narratives on Social Media: Recent Observations from the DRC

25 February 2026

This briefing by Insecurity Insight analyses public social media activity from 25 January - 15 February 2026 in the DRC.



Understanding how aid actors are portrayed online is increasingly critical. Social media narratives shape community perceptions of humanitarian organisations and can influence operational access, and staff safety. As online discourse becomes more central to how aid is understood and contested, monitoring these narratives is an important component for aid acceptance, security management, programming and communication with affected populations. By tracking both emerging and entrenched narratives on social media, this briefing provides insight into how public sentiment towards aid actors is developing. It aims to support policymakers and humanitarian practitioners in strengthening community acceptance in a rapidly shifting aid environment.

This briefing is part of a longer-term initiative for the DRC to examine how aid agency acceptance or rejection is expressed on social media. The content is selected based on predefined lists of UN agencies, international NGOs, local NGOs and civil society organisations and general key words related to humanitarian and development assistance in the DRC. Comments associated with posts that attracted the highest number of comments were analysed qualitatively to identify dominant narratives. **This edition covers examples of**

- **How security-linked developments among them MONUSCO troop withdrawal, ceasefire talks, UN meetings, and the reopening of Goma airport** trigger performance-based scrutiny, with UN actors primarily assessed against expectations of immediate security outcomes rather than mandate limitations.
- **How thematic programming posts about health and gender** generate comparatively constructive engagement, with limited politicisation in the high-engagement sample reviewed.
- **How donor and diplomatic messaging (EU and Belgium)** activates geopolitical and mineral exploitation narratives.
- **How isolated low-engagement posts reflect** broader scepticism toward international actors, but based on open-source accessible indicators show no evidence of coordinated amplification or organised targeting within the monitoring period.

The selection does not represent the full scope of online discussions on aid in the DRC but highlights the most visible public narratives during a 22 day period of direct relevance to perceptions related to aid. To respect privacy, the analysis draws only on **public posts with identifiable DRC-based IP addresses**, excluding any content that users did not consciously make public such as discussions that took place in private groups, closed networks, encrypted messaging platforms, and from users who choose to mask their location.

Key Takeaways

Reactions to South African troop withdrawal from MONUSCO on Facebook: security performance dominates, limited direct aid-sector criticism

Five edited media Facebook posts published between **08–09 February 2026** reported that South Africa would withdraw its peacekeepers from MONUSCO, referencing official notification to the UN Secretary-General and describing the process as coordinated and progressive. Several posts connected the announcement to ongoing regional diplomacy and consultations with Congolese authorities. The posts generated **116 comments**, of which **14 expressed negative sentiment towards the aid sector or**

international system actors. The remaining comments were neutral or unrelated to MONUSCO, including political commentary focused on domestic leadership, geopolitical speculation, procedural questions, and some spam content. Many comments assessed the withdrawal in light of MONUSCO's perceived effectiveness over time, particularly in relation to protection of civilians and territorial control. References to the mission's 27-year presence (MONUSCO was established in **July 2010** but a significant amount of social media users use 27 years) were used by some commenters to question impact or outcomes.

- **Criticism framed as failure rather than mandate debate:** Where negative sentiment appeared, it was generally framed as dissatisfaction with results rather than discussion of mandate limitations or peacekeeping constraints. The criticism centred on expectations of security improvement.

“Let them leave. They have failed in their mission.” (“Qu’ils partent Ils ont échoué Ala mission”)

- **Allegations of complicity:** A small number of comments suggested that the UN or specific contingents had supported or tolerated armed groups. These claims were not dominant in volume but were present in the thread.

“Distraction UN strong support for M23” (“Distraction ONU grand soutien du M23”)

- **Economic and geopolitical interpretations:** Some commenters attributed the withdrawal to geopolitical tensions (including references to relations between South Africa and the United States) or suggested foreign troops had economic motivations.

“It's normal that South African soldiers can leave Congolese soil, given that the DRC has grown closer to the US and there is tension between the US and South Africa. They have nothing to worry about either 🏃🏃” (“C'est normal que des militaires sud africains puissent quitter le sol congolais, vu que la RDC s'est rapprochée de l'usa et il y a clopin clopant entre l'USA et l'Afrique du Sud, Basalaka na bango pe eloko te 🏃🏃”)

- One comment singled out the Indian contingent of MONUSCO, calling for its immediate withdrawal and alleging complicity in the conflict. Even isolated claims of complicity directed at specific national contingents carry reputational and operational risk. Such allegations can contribute to distrust at community level, personalise institutional grievances, and potentially increase hostility towards identifiable troop contributors if amplified in future discussions.

“The Congolese population is demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Indian contingent because it is the most complicit in the war in eastern DRC.” (“La population congolaise demande le retrait immédiat du contingent indien car il est le plus utilisé pour la complicité de la guerre à l'EST de la RDC.”)

What this tells us

- The announcement of troop withdrawal generated relatively low levels of direct hostility towards aid actors or against MONUSCO, with only 12% of comments expressing negative sentiment towards international system actors.
- However, where MONUSCO was substantively discussed, it continued to be evaluated primarily through perceived security outcomes rather than through mandate language or institutional framing. Even when posts described the withdrawal as coordinated and procedural, commenters interpreted it through questions of effectiveness, responsibility, and political alignment.

- This suggests that MONUSCO-related announcements are likely to trigger performance-based scrutiny, while broader narratives about complicity or external interests, though limited in this sample, remain part of the wider interpretive environment in which international actors operate.

Reactions to ceasefire talks and UN meetings: scepticism of mechanisms drives aid-sector criticism

Eight edited media Facebook posts and one post on X published, reaching an estimated **570,000 social media users**, between **08–14 February 2026** focused on ceasefire talks and meetings between Congolese authorities and the adjoint UN secretary. The posts highlighted the implementation of the Washington and Doha engagements, the ceasefire, protection of civilians, and the planned monitoring and verification mechanism, presented as support that could be operationalised under UN Security Council resolutions. Across **237 comments**, **55 (approximately 23%) were categorised as negative towards the aid sector**, including **20 comments directly criticising MONUSCO**. Much of the engagement questioned whether ceasefire processes and verification arrangements can deliver change on the ground.

- **Rejection of UN presence rather than critique of mechanisms:** Some commenters dismissed the UN's role entirely, suggesting adhering to Trump's Peace Council instead.

“We don't want the UN here because they do absolutely nothing. It would be better to join Trump's Peace Council.” (“Nous ne voulons pas de l' ONU ici parce que ils ne font absolument rien , il sera mieux d'adhérer dans le conseil de Paix de trump”)

- **Personalised distrust of the visiting official:** Rather than debating policy, certain comments targeted the individual UN representative, portraying him as aligned with foreign interests and not acting in the DRC's favour.

“This man is a demon who should be avoided. He has done more to work for France than to help the DRC. We must be wary of him. 🤔🤔” (“Ce Mr. C'est un démon qu'il ne faut plus approché,il a plus travailler pour la France,que pour aider plus la RDC,on doit ses méfier de lui,🤔🤔”)

- **Long-term failure narrative:** A repeated theme suggested that two decades of UN presence have yielded no meaningful change despite significant resources and loss of life. The meeting was therefore interpreted as part of a recurring cycle of symbolic diplomacy without impact.

“It is MONUSCO that is behind this war in our country. No one is unaware of this.”(“C'est la monusco qui est à la base de cette guerre dans notre pays personne n'ignore”)

- **Complicity framing:** Some comments escalated criticism further, alleging that MONUSCO is itself responsible for the conflict

“He has done a hundred thousand things in this country, but nothing changes. Yet he is welcomed with honor every time by his slaves, even after millions of deaths and billions of dollars worth of minerals looted. This world is run from somewhere else...” (“Il a fait cent mille tous dans ce pays, mais rien ne change mais il est reçu avec honneur à chaque fois par ses esclaves, même après des millions de morts et milliards de dollars des minerais pillés,ce monde est dirigé ailleurs...”)

What this tells us

- In this dataset of social media comments, ceasefire and verification messaging triggered a sizable share of UN and MONUSCO negative sentiment. The dominant driver is an expectations gap: ceasefire mechanisms are judged against immediate security outcomes, reduced violence, protection of civilians, and territorial recovery, rather than against the procedural steps of monitoring and verification.
- The narrative environment suggests that institutional distrust remains a stronger driver of negative sentiment than disagreement over specific peace mechanisms.
- Comments expressing negative sentiment were more frequent following announcements of intentions and plans around the ceasefire than a decision about ending a presence such as the decision by South Africa to leave MONUSCO, suggesting a greater interest among commentators with a critical attitude to express and influence views about future developments than the desire to analyse and comment on the past.

Cholera outbreak: limited engagement, no harmful narratives detected in high-visibility posts.

Among the highest-engagement posts analysed during the selected period, coverage of the cholera outbreak did not generate harmful narratives. Within this subset, only a post by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) addressed the broader context of epidemic response (in reference to measles in 2025), highlighting patient numbers reached in collaboration with the Ministry of Health. The post generated limited but positive engagement, with comments expressing encouragement and appreciation for MSF's work. No visible attempts to politicise the outbreak, spread misinformation, or question the legitimacy of the response appeared within the high-engagement sample reviewed for this briefing.

Reopening of Goma airport

Six posts (five on Facebook, one on X) on the reopening of Goma International Airport reached approximately **270,000 social media users** and generated **227 comments**. Of these, **39 comments (around 17%) expressed negative sentiment toward the aid sector**, including **15 directly critical of MONUSCO**. The posts reported that, after a year of closure following the takeover of Goma by the AFC/M23, a MONUSCO helicopter landed carrying the Acting Head of Mission. The reopening was framed as linked to ceasefire verification, humanitarian access, and the need for security guarantees from all parties. A dominant reaction challenged the framing itself. Many commenters argued that the landing of a MONUSCO helicopter does not constitute an official reopening. The scepticism focused less on MONUSCO's presence and more on perceived exaggeration of what had occurred. Other reactions included:

- **Control and legitimacy concerns:** A significant share of comments centred on who controls the airport. Many questioned whether the AFC/M23 had authorised the landing and whether engaging operationally with infrastructure under their control amounts to recognition or legitimisation. Some comments framed engagement around the airport as evidence of “balkanisation”, arguing that reopening under current conditions symbolises divided authority rather than restored state control.

“Balkanization begins, two capitals, two airports, two international entrances. Everything is ready.” (“Balkanisation commence, deux capitales, deux aéroports, deux entrées internationales. Tout est prêt”)

“With this maneuver, MONUSCO risks legalizing the M23. Let's see how things unfold.” (“Avec cette manœuvre, la Monusco risque de légaliser le M23, voyons voir à l'allure où iront les choses.”)

- **Peace before logistics:** Another recurrent theme was prioritisation. Some commenters argued that reopening an airport is secondary to expelling foreign forces, restoring territorial control, or reopening banks and public services. A smaller number rejected humanitarian framing altogether, asserting that dignity and sovereignty matter more than aid access. This narrative does not necessarily reject civilians benefiting from access, but reflects frustration with what is perceived as sequencing: infrastructure before sovereignty.

“Avoid systematically supporting Balkanization. First impose the withdrawal of Rwandan foreign troops from the DRC in accordance with Resolution 2373, instead of looking for ways to favour aggressors by opening this airport for other purposes. Use the one in Kisangani, Ah Lacroix, alias Mr. Double Dealer.” (“Éviter de soutenir systématiquement la balkanisation. Imposé d'abord le retrait des troupes étrangères rwandaises en Rdc selon la résolution 2373 au lieu de chercher comment favoriser nos agresseurs en ouvrant cet aéroport pour d'autres fins. Utilisez celle de Kisangani ah Lacroix alias Mr double Jeu.”)

“We don't need your humanitarian aid in Goma. Send it to Gaza or Ukraine, where there is also war. We have everything we need here. We just need peace, that's all.” (“Nous n'avons pas besoin de votre aide humanitaire à Goma, envoyez ça à Gaza ou en Ukraine, là aussi il y a la guerre. Nous avons tout chez-nous. On a juste besoin de la paix et c'est tout.”)

What this tells us

- Even though the posts framed the landing as conditional and linked to ceasefire monitoring, many commenters assessed it through questions of authority, territorial control, and legitimacy.
- Negative sentiment toward the aid sector remained a minority of overall engagement (17%), and direct criticism of MONUSCO represented an even smaller subset. However, the narratives expressed, particularly around legitimising armed actors and contributing to “balkanisation”, are highly emotive, politically charged and could have an outsized impact on aid and peacekeeping operations.
- Technical language about “guarantees” and “verification mechanisms” is interpreted by some as evidence of political alignment or compromise. How such steps are communicated, especially clarifying what is and is not meant by “reopening”, is likely to shape whether logistical developments are seen as practical progress or political concession.

Continued MONUSCO mandate confusion and expectations gap

Consistent with findings in the [12–24 January 2026 brief](#), negative sentiment towards MONUSCO during this reporting period continues to be driven by mandate confusion and an entrenched expectations gap. Social media users frequently assess the mission as if it were an offensive military force tasked with defeating armed groups. Where violence persists, this is interpreted not as a limitation of mandate, but as proof of failure, complicity, or hidden intent.

A high-engagement edited media Facebook post (313 comments) sought to clarify this distinction, by citing the UN Secretary-General who stated that MONUSCO “**has neither the mandate nor the capacity to impose peace**” emphasising that the mission is not an offensive military, cannot defeat the M23 militarily, and is limited to protecting civilians, supporting state authority, and facilitating dialogue. Rather than narrowing the expectations gap, this clarification triggered strong backlash. Many responses rejected the premise and questioned the mission’s continued presence if it cannot militarily impose

peace. Examples include:

“Why negotiate with the rebels? With the resources available to MONUSCO, why can't they simply be neutralized?” (“Pourquoi négocier avec les rebelles ? Avec les moyens dont dispose la Monusco, pourquoi ne peut on pas les neutraliser purement et simplement ?”)

Other comments went further, reframing mandate limitations as evidence of bad faith or collusion:

“We all now that UN is behind the enemies plz UN out this country 🇷🇺 all of this genocide is going on you knows it well” (comment made in english)

An isolated claim that the mandate has “changed” to an offensive posture illustrate how misinformation or misinterpretation of the mandate can deepen confusion, raise unrealistic expectations of military action, and increase frustration or hostility when those expectations are not met.

“the mandate has changed it is an offensive mandate with new troops.” (“le mandat a changé c'est un mandat offensif avec de nouvelles troupes.”)

As observed in the previous brief, attempts to communicate mandate boundaries can inadvertently reinforce perceptions of ineffectiveness if audiences equate legitimacy with combat outcomes. The core issue is not lack of information alone, but a divergence between institutional definitions of peacekeeping (protection, stabilisation, facilitation) and public expectations of decisive military action.

→ The persistence of this narrative across reporting periods suggests that mandate clarification, in isolation, is unlikely to shift perceptions without simultaneously addressing outcome-based expectations around civilian protection and territorial control.

Gender-focused posts: largely constructive engagement, limited politicisation

Four Facebook posts, three from UN Women and one from MONUSCO, addressed gender equality planning, women's leadership in peace processes, women's participation in media, and female peacekeepers supporting agricultural security in Ituri province.

- **UN Women posts:** Engagement on the three UN Women posts was predominantly constructive. Comments focused on:
 - Requests for expansion to other provinces

“When do you plan to expand this plan to the provinces?” (“Quand comptez-vous élargir ce plan dans les Provinces?”)

- Calls for inclusion of specific groups

“Please consider supporting non-profit organizations for women with disabilities.” (“Daignez svp penser aux Asbl des Femmes handicapées”)

- Interest in participation

“How can I participate?” (“Comment participer ?”)

No visible backlash against gender equality language, women's leadership in peace processes, or women's media participation emerged within the comments reviewed.

“When women speak up, the whole community moves forward! Congratulations on this inspiring initiative! 🍊” (“Quand les femmes s'expriment, c'est toute la communauté qui avance ! Félicitations pour cette initiative inspirante ! 🍊”)


- **MONUSCO female contingent post:** The MONUSCO post featuring the Indonesian female contingent securing agricultural zones in Ituri generated mixed but limited engagement. Some comments expressed appreciation, while others were dismissive or critical. One comment redirected attention to ongoing violence elsewhere. Importantly, the criticism did not centre on gender or women's participation. The few negative reactions were directed at MONUSCO more broadly and reflect the wider pattern observed in security-related posts during this monitoring period.

What this tells us

- Gender-focused posts, particularly those framed around planning, leadership, and community-level impact, generated constructive engagement and minimal politicised backlash in the high-engagement sample reviewed. Where negative reactions appeared (in the MONUSCO case), they reflected generalised frustration with the mission rather than opposition to women's roles or gender equality initiatives.
- This suggests that gender programming content, when presented as practical and community-oriented, does not currently activate the same delegitimising narratives that appear in posts directly tied to ceasefires, territorial control, or high-level security diplomacy.

Key actor analysis

During the selected monitoring period, a small number of individual social media users directly posted (instead of commenting) critical content about the aid sector. These posts were low engagement and did not generate significant amplification or coordinated interaction. The criticism observed reflects underlying scepticism toward international actors operating in eastern DRC rather than an organised campaign targeting specific organisations. These posts are distinct from the 25% of negative comments identified within the broader dataset. Individual account-level analysis was not conducted for the wider comment sample due to technical limitations and GDPR/privacy considerations. Even for the small number of standalone posts reviewed, analysis was restricted to observable surface-level indicators (e.g. engagement, profile transparency), and no deeper behavioural, network, or identity assessments were undertaken in order to respect data protection and ethical monitoring standards.



1. Limited Scale and Reach

- Only four relevant accounts identified in the review sample.
- Engagement was low (minimal replies, resharing, or interaction).
- No evidence of coordinated amplification or networked behaviour.
- Narratives remained contained within individual accounts.

This indicates isolated sentiment rather than emerging mobilisation.

2. Nature of the Criticism

- **Credibility and Documentation:** One account questioned the validity or timing of an NGO report, suggesting they

lacked sufficient evidence. This post framed concerns procedurally rather than spreading fabricated claims.

- **Political Alignment Narratives:** Two posts linked NGOs or foundations to broader geopolitical agendas, alleging alignment with foreign political interests. These claims were not supported with evidence but reflect wider political distrust.
- **Structural Distrust and Resource Narratives:** One post content echoed longstanding narratives that international actors benefit from instability or are indirectly linked to mineral exploitation.

3. Profile Assessment

- Two verified public figures (journalist and activist) and one small reach but verified account.
- One non-verified account using a likely AI generated profile picture.
- No bot-like activity patterns detected.
- No signs of coordinated posting behaviour.

The content appears organic and opinion-driven rather than orchestrated.

La propagande "sauvons Kagame" est en marche. Les ONG mafieux, les fondations, media Français, anciens chefs d'État Africain, Sénateurs Démocratie Africain, des traîtres Congolais and ect ...tous ayant bénéficié du pillage a l'Est de la RDC. montent au créneau pour sauver Paul Kagame. [#Congo #Rwanda](#)

[Translate post](#)

● #RDC La Fondation Bill Clinton pour la Paix #FBCP dénonce la #détenition prolongée de 20 officiers et sous-officiers arrêtés depuis 2024 en province (Katanga, Kasai et Est) et transférés depuis + d'1 an dans des cachots clandestins près du Palais de Marbre. La #FBCP demande

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4. Risk Assessment

- No viral traction observed for these four accounts.
- No incitement or operational targeting detected in the reviewed sample.

Un hélicoptère de l'ONU atterrit à [#Goma](#), un an après la prise de la ville par le [#M23](#). La cheffe de la [@MONUSCO](#) vient pr le suivi du mécanisme de vérification du cessez-le-feu.

Mais pendant ce temps, Goma reste sous control.

La paix doit être réelle, pas seulement diplomatique.

However, the narratives align with broader, recurring distrust toward international actors in eastern DRC. While not amplified in this instance, such themes can resurface during heightened political or security events.

Donor-related posts: limited engagement, concentrated scepticism

Two Facebook posts addressed calls for a stronger European Union response to the crisis in eastern DRC, including Belgium's appeal for greater EU action. The first provided detailed reporting on discussions among EU foreign ministers, referencing humanitarian funding levels, diplomatic engagement, sanctions discussions, and the urgency of reopening Goma airport. The second reiterated Belgium's call for coordinated European action, particularly to facilitate humanitarian access through the airport. Together, the two posts generated **only 38 comments**, indicating relatively limited engagement compared to other high-visibility topics during the monitoring period. Of these, **14 comments (around 37%) expressed negative sentiment toward the EU, Belgium, or donors more broadly.**

- **EU and Belgium framed as complicit or hypocritical:** Some negative comments accused the EU, and Belgium specifically, of double standards. Several framed European states as benefiting from mineral trade while publicly expressing humanitarian concern.

"The hypocrites who play the game of arsonist and firefighter (EU) think we are too stupid to understand their double game!" ("Les hypocrites qui jouent au jeu de pyromane à la fois pompier(U E) pensent que nous sommes trop bête pour comprendre leur double jeux !")

"They  are struggling to sanction Rwanda because they were buying contraband minerals." ("Ils  ont du mal a sanctionner le Rwanda car ils achetaient des minerais de contrebande")


- **Calls for sanctions and accountability:** Some comments focused less on rejecting EU engagement and more on demanding concrete action, particularly sanctions against Rwanda or President Kagame. In this framing, humanitarian aid was seen as insufficient without political consequences.

“Belgium is speaking out today, but where has it been all this time? When will sanctions be imposed on Rwanda? Only theory in favor of the DRC 🇷🇺😞😞😞” (“La Belgique parle aujourd'hui mais de tous ces temps elle était où ? A quand les sanctions au Rwanda ? seulement la théorie en faveur de la RDC 🇷🇺😞😞😞”)

What this tells us

- Although overall engagement was low, negative sentiment was proportionally concentrated within the comments that did engage with the substance of the posts. European donor visibility appears to activate established narratives around mineral exploitation, geopolitical alignment, and historical grievance more readily than technical humanitarian updates.
- Importantly, criticism was not a blanket rejection of international involvement. Rather, many comments could be interpreted as framing EU engagement as credible only if accompanied by sanctions, political pressure, or clear action addressing Rwanda’s role.

Breakdown of negative sentiment, by narrative category



All negative comments directed at the aid sector were categorised and grouped into narrative categories to identify recurring themes in online discourse.

While **618 comments** (out of 2,459 total comments) expressed negative sentiment towards the aid sector, the chart reflects **652 coded narrative instances**, as some individual comments contained more than one negative narrative and were therefore assigned to multiple categories.

This approach captures the full range of themes present rather than limiting each comment to a single classification.

Other resources

Insecurity Insight regularly examines key discussions around aid activities driven by information posted by IP addresses in the DRC, Sudan, and Syria. Understanding how aid actors are portrayed online is increasingly critical. Social media narratives shape community perceptions of humanitarian organisations and can influence operational access and staff safety. As online discourse becomes more central to how aid is understood and contested, monitoring these narratives is an important component for aid acceptance, security management, programming and communication with affected populations.

Key numbers

Social media is a fast-moving space, requiring analysis to be focused on clearly identified subjects and questions. The figures below describe how a much larger online communication was reduced to a manageable sample of comments by focusing on posts with the highest engagement around topics that contribute to shaping public perceptions of aid actors. Because social media connects local experiences with external audiences, comment language is a key indicator of how local and external narratives interact. The distribution of comments by organisation type reflects the complex structure of the aid sector, in which UN agencies, international organisations, and local civil society operate with different mandates and levels of visibility, and are therefore perceived in distinct ways. Negative sentiment is highlighted separately because, even when limited in volume, it can play an outsized role in generating harmful narratives, including misinformation, delegitimisation, and disinformation, with implications for acceptance, access, and staff safety.

Scale of analysis

- **Posts analysed: 50**
- **Estimated total reach: 5.6 million social media users**
- **Total comments analysed: 2,459**

Comment language

- **French: 92.4% (2,273)**
- **Lingala: 3.5% (87)**
- **English: 1.0% (25)**
- **Swahili: 0.7% (17)**
- **Emojis/no text: 2.2% (54)**
- **Other languages: 0.1% (3)**

Comment distribution by organisation type

- **MONUSCO: 39.5% (971)**
- **UN system: 33.5% (823)**
- **UN agency: 10.9% (267)**
- **International humanitarian organisations: 7.1% (175)**
- **Local NGOs / CSOs: 7.0% (172)**
- **Donors: 1.5% (37)**
- **General (non-specific): 0.6% (14)**

Negative sentiment

- **Negative comments: 25% of comments**

Data Use and Privacy Disclaimer

This report includes analysis of publicly available social media content collected from open platforms. All data has been anonymised to remove or obscure identifying details, and no content from closed groups was used. The analysis was conducted in the public interest and in line with the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), under a legitimate interest basis. The purpose of this analysis is to support humanitarian dialogue, inform policy, protect aid workers and those they help, and contribute to public interest research. This document is published by Insecurity Insight - a Humanitarian to Humanitarian (H2H) organisation committed to the Humanitarian Principles. Funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

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Suggested citation: Insecurity Insight. 2026. Tracking Aid Narratives on Social Media: Emerging Trends in the DRC, 25 January - 15 February 2026, Switzerland: Insecurity Insight. <https://bit.ly/25Jan-15Feb2026DRCSMMBrief>

